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The importance of capital loss offset provisions in a world of risk is well documented in the 
tax literature. However, the potential deadweight losses owing to imperfect offset has not 
been fully explored. This paper develops a framework whereby that investigation can be 
carried out and utilizes numerical simulations to investigate the size of potential losses. 
Results show that when the government and private sector are equally efficient in handling 
market risk, welfare losses owing to the absence of offset provisions could be substantial. 
Under plausible assumptions about attitudes towards risk and time preference, and with a 
capital income tax rate of forty percent, over sixty cents per dollar of tax revenue raised would 
be dissipated. In contrast, full loss offset would reduce that loss to approximately fourteen 
cents. 
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Industrial countries generally allow losses from the sale of capital assets as
o⁄sets against taxable capital gains. Allowing a portion of any de￿cit as a
deduction from other income and permiting net losses to be carried forward or
back to previous tax years are common tax code rules.1 Whatever the rules,
o⁄set provisions reduce tax liability for investors incurring capital losses and
encourage risky capital investment.
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) pointed out that partial rather than full loss
o⁄set provisions might be instituted because of a government￿ s inability to
distinguish between consumption and production activities and also could be
desirable if individuals were able to in￿ uence relevant states of nature. Auer-
bach (1986) provided a dynamic analysis of taxation impacts on investment
decisions and proposed a number of rationales for asymmetry, including the
desire to limit ￿rms￿deduction of ￿ctional expenses and the wish to discour-
age operation of unpro￿table ￿rms.
Connections between loss o⁄set provisions and behaviour in the face of
risk have been well noted in the literature, beginning with the analysis of
Domar and Musgrave (1944). They observed that in the absence of o⁄set, tax
increases lessen risk-taking. Stiglitz (1969), using a more general expected
utility model, con￿rmed the disincentive e⁄ect and it has been observed in
similar models under various tax scenarios, including those of Mossin (1968),
Feldstein (1969) and Ahsan (1974).2
Most studies of this genre had ignored how the public sector would deal
with the revenue risk and assumed in e⁄ect the state to be risk-neutral.
When dealing with capital risks, the latter assumption may well be untenable.
Bulow and Summers (1984) and Gordon (1985) have argued that, especially
for corporate tax revenue, government need not be any more able to bear risk
than the private sector. A key implication is that the costs of and bene￿ts
from risk-taking remain entirely in the private sector.3
Early investigations of deadweight loss (DWL) owing to capital income
taxation, including work by Boskin (1978), Feldstein (1978) and Summers
(1981) ignored risk. Fullerton and Gordon (1983) and Slemrod (1983) in-
corporated risk into their analysis by replacing the tax-induced change in
1The current United States tax code allows up to $3000 per year in capital losses to
be written o⁄ against other income. Canadian losses in any one year can be applied only
against gains.
2Sandmo (1985) provides a still-relevant review of taxation impacts on savings and
risk-taking.
3In order to accomplish the latter, as detailed in the next section, we assume that tax
revenues are returned to each taxpayer in amounts identical to revenues collected.
2behaviour in Harberger￿ s classic formula by its expected value. Gordon and
Wilson (1989), examining DWL under uncertainty with full loss o⁄set, argued
that in a dynamic multi-period setting the correct measure was the certainty
equivalent of the lottery and concluded that in neglecting risk-aversion, pre-
vious studies had over-estimated e¢ ciency costs.
The present analysis employs a simple two-period, two-asset, consumption-
savings model to identify and measure e¢ ciency losses in a risky world, com-
paring impacts under full and imperfect loss o⁄sets. To allow focus on the
e⁄ects of alternative tax rules we assume that the public sector is no more
or less e¢ cient than the private in handling risk, that there is no asymmet-
ric information between individuals and the government, and that all risk is
borne by the private sector.
Under these conditions and assuming non-expected utility preferences,
we carry out numerical simulations of impacts and welfare costs. Starting
from an initial tax rate of forty percent, we determine that under plausible
assumptions about investor attitudes towards risk and consumption versus
savings, the welfare loss from capital income taxation without o⁄set would
be substantial, amounting to approximately sixty two cents per dollar of tax
revenue or some 18 percent of savings. In contrast, the welfare loss from
capital income taxation with full loss o⁄set would be approximately fourteen
cents per dollar, or just 5 percent of savings.
The contribution of the present research is twofold. First, it presents a
framework within which to calculate deadweight losses generated by capital
income taxation under alternative o⁄set rules and under the plausible rule
that all risks remain in the private sector. Second, it examines the impacts
that attitudes towards risk and consumption substitutability each have on
tax-induced behaviour, and thence on welfare, under a given o⁄set regime.
In each case, simulations are employed to demonstrate outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II models
investor decision-making. Section III uses non-expected utility preferences to
value the deadweight loss from distortions owing to capital income taxation.
Section IV evaluates outcomes when capital asset selling prices, and hence tax
revenues, are risky. Section V examines the sensitivity of DWL to alternative
parameter values and distribution assumptions. Section VI concludes. Much
of the technical derivation is relegated to the Appendix.
32 The Portfolio - Savings Decision
Consider an individual who works in the ￿rst period and earns a non-stochastic
wage income Y1. The household allocates this income to current consump-
tion, denoted by C1, and savings, S1. Savings, S1, can be invested in a risky
asset a1, and a riskless investment m1 in order to provide consumption for
retirement. Thus in the ￿rst period:
C1 = Y1 ￿ S1 = Y1 ￿ (a1 + m1) (1)
In the second period, the safe asset yields an after tax return of (1 ￿ ￿)r
where ￿ is the tax on capital income and r the before tax return per unit of
investment. The state of nature i determines the return of the risky asset, x2i.
A good and a bad state of nature are modeled. In the good state of nature,
the risky asset yields an after tax return x2g(1 ￿ ￿) > 0 with probability p
and in the bad state of nature x2b(1 ￿ ’￿) < 0 with probability (1 ￿ p) per
unit of investment.4 The parameter 0 ￿ ’ ￿ 1 indicates the level of o⁄set
provision. Full loss o⁄set (FLO) occurs when ’ = 1. When FLO is in e⁄ect,
the household pays x2g￿ in taxes per unit of investment if the good state of
nature occurs and is allowed a loss o⁄set in the bad state of nature equal
to ￿x2b￿. In the case of no loss o⁄set (NLO), ’ = 0; the household still
pays x2g￿ in taxes in the good state of nature but is not allowed to o⁄set
any losses if the bad state materilizes. A second period stochastic lump-sum
transfer from the state, denoted by G2i is also provided.
During retirement the households consumes C2b if the bad state of nature
materializes and C2g if the good state occurs.5
C2b = (1 + r(1 ￿ ￿))m1 + (1 + x2b(1 ￿ ’￿))a1 + G2b (2a)
C2g = (1 + r(1 ￿ ￿))m1 + (1 + (1 ￿ ￿)x2g)a1 + G2g (2b)
The household￿ s preferences are described by the class of non-expected
utility preferences as formulated in a two period setting by Selden (1978,
79). These preferences include the corresponding expected cardinal utility
function as a special case. The household is assumed to make choices be-
tween current and certainty equivalent future consumption, CE(C2). The
preferences are: 6
4Limited liability requires that x2b > ￿1.
5There are no bequests in the model.






where the consumer￿ s rate of time preference is re￿ ected in the discount
factor ￿ = 1=(1+￿) with ￿ measuring the rate of time preference and the inter-
temporal substitutability between current and certainty equivalent future
consumption is measured by ￿ = 1
1￿￿.






where, ￿ is the relative relative risk averson parameter measuring aversion
to risk taking activity.7 The household computes the certainty equivalent
future consumption given its risk preferences, and then relying on the inter-
temporal substitutability combines current consumption with the certainty
equivalent future consumption.








The household sets the marginal utility of current consumption equal to
the future value of the marginal utility of future consumption adjusted for




2 z2) = 0 (6)
where z2 is the after tax excess return of the risky asset relative to the
safe asset. In the good state of nature z2g = (x2g ￿ r)(1 ￿ ￿) > 0, while
in the bad state of nature z2b = (x2b(1 ￿ ’￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)r) < 0. Equation
(6) states that at the optimum the expected marginal gain from risk taking
is equal to that of the riskless investment in terms of their contribution to
future consumption.8
7The utility function takes on the familiar von-Neumann Morgenstern form when 1 ￿
￿ = ￿. Risk neutral constant elasticity of inter-temporal substitution preferences (RINCE)
developed by Farmer (1990) is observed when ￿ = 0.
8An interior solution obtains so long as the expected return on the risky asset exceeds
the return on the riskless investment.
5Since it is assumed that the government is no more (or less) e¢ cient in
handling risk we assume that tax revenue is returned to the taxpayer in the
amount identical to revenues collected. This implies that the risk remains
within the private sector, and hence investors ultimately bear the entire risk.
Gordon justi￿es such an assumption as follows:
"Given that the government absorbs a sizable fraction of the risk as a
result of the taxes on corporate income, one might have expected the market
risk premium to fall. However, the government cannot freely dispose of the
risk it bears. Individuals must ultimately bear this risk, whether through
random tax rates on other income, random government expenditures, or
random government de￿cits" (1985, p5).
Thus given optimal choices with taxes and o⁄set provisions, the govern-
ment transfers:
G2g = ￿r(Y1 ￿ C
￿
1) + ￿(x2g ￿ r)a
￿
1 (7a)
G2b = ￿r(Y1 ￿ C
￿
1) + ￿(’x2b ￿ r)a
￿
1 (7b)
where G2i (i = g;b) is precisely the tax paid by a typical individual.
Under this assumption appendix 1 derives the explicit optimal values of asset




1 = c1(￿;’)Y1 and a
￿
1 = a1(￿;’)Y1 ((8))
The optimal values of consumption and risky asset holdings are linear
functions of the individual￿ s endowment, Y1. Appendix 2 proceeds to derive
the optimal response of current consumption and risky asset to an increase
in capital income taxation assuming all risk remain with the private sector.








< 0 for all values of ’ (9b)
9NRS stands for no risk sharing by the government. The stochastic lump sum transfer
is given to the individual in the same period it was collected but at the new inter-temporal
price of consumption and asset choice. This eliminates all income e⁄ects.
6These two expressions measure the expected change in current consump-
tion due to a change in the tax rate and that of the risky asset under the
assumption of no risk sharing by the government (NRS).10 Current consump-
tion is encouraged, while at the same time risky asset chioce is discouraged,
because the increase in the capital income tax alters the relative price of
current and future consumption distorting intertemporal decisions (i.e., see
equation 5 which still holds). In the case of imperfect loss o⁄set, risky asset
holdings are discouraged even more because the relative asset returns are also
distorted (i.e., see equation 6). The return of the stochastic tax revenue back
to the household eliminates all income e⁄ects and only substitution e⁄ects
remain. Taxation has no stimulating e⁄ects on risk taking activity.
.
3 The Deadweight Loss of Capital Income
Taxation
The stochastic lump sum rebate of taxes paid would not be su¢ cient to hold
the investor on the same indi⁄erence level as prior to the imposition of the
tax, because the capital income tax would entail an e¢ ciency loss by creating
a distortion in the inter-temporal price of future consumption as well as to
the assets￿after tax returns given partial loss o⁄set provisions. In what
follows we use the Diamond-McFadden (1974) approach to measuring the
marginal deadweight loss (MDL) of capital income taxation, which quanti￿es
the additional income (consumption in our case) required by the investor in
the current period in order to remain just as well o⁄ after the tax increase
and the consequent transfer payment. MDL is equal to
dL1
d￿ v=c where L1 is
the additional consumption needed in the ￿rst period to make the household
























10In an important extension, Gordon and Wilson (1989) argue that in a multi-period
context riskiness in future decision variables cannot be measured merely by the expected
value. The correct procedure would be to use the certainty equivalent of the tax-induced
change in Xi. However, in the present context, all decisions are made in the current period,
and hence, are una⁄ected by future risk considerations.
7The MDL is equal to the value of the tax outstanding per unit of the i-th
activity multiplied by the change in the i-th activity due to the tax change.11
MDL is positive (
@L1
@￿ v=c > 0) since
@C￿
1
@￿ NRS > 0 and with imperfect loss




@￿ NRS < 0.12 The value of the tax outstanding per unit of consumption
activity is measured by the term r￿
(1+r(1￿￿)) and that of a risky asset choice
by the term
￿x2b(1￿’)
(1￿￿)(1+r(1￿￿)). For the former, the quantity (r￿) is precisely
the amount of tax paid on a unit of risk-less investment. This is entirely
consistent with the approach of Gordon and Wilson, who explained that
the "the size of the tax distortion is the same on each asset, and can be




(1￿￿)(1+r(1￿￿)) re￿ ects the distortion in the relative asset return
that is associated with the partial loss o⁄set provision of the tax code. The
value of tax outstanding is equal to zero under full loss o⁄set provision and
negative under partial loss o⁄set provisions. With full loss o⁄set provisions
there is no deadweight loss associated with the portfolio choice since the value
of the tax outstanding per unit of the risky activity is equal to zero. With full
loss o⁄set provisions the deadweight loss consists only of the ￿rst right-hand
term in equation (10). Furthermore, under full loss o⁄set provisions it is the
elasticity of substitution that establishes the existence of deadweight loss due
to capital income taxation (given a non-zero EIS) as in the case of certainty.
The relative risk aversion determines the magnitude and not the direction of
the DWL ￿gure under full loss o⁄set provisions. In the more general case of
partial loss o⁄set provisions both the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution
and the attitude towards risk play important roles.
The MDL measure above does not take into account the incremental
revenue raised from an increase in capital income taxation (MTR = @TR
@￿ ).
In order to adjust the MDL for MTR, the Marginal cost of public funds
(MCF) expression is used which is given by: 13
11This measure of the marginal e¢ ciency cost of capital income taxation under un-
certainty is related the one derived by Arnold Harberger (1971). He expressed DWL as
the product of a tax distortion term and a quantity measuring the tax-induced change
in behaviour. The Harberger measure was developed under conditions of certainty, and
later authors have interpreted the measure as applicable to behaviour under uncertainty
by qualifying the tax-induced change in behavior by its expected value. The parallel be-
tween our result and that of the traditional Harberger formula is made transparent in
what follows in the text.
12MDL will be negative if the government is more e¢ cient in handling risks than the
private sector, leading to a marginal welfare bene￿t.




By increasing marginally the capital income tax rate, additional revenue
is raised to ￿nance public expenditures (i.e., MTR) but this increase also
results in an additional cost, in terms of e¢ ciency (i.e., MDL). Thus the
MCF is the e¢ ciency cost (in cents) of raising a dollar of revenue through
distortionary taxation beyond that of the dollar being raised. If MDL = 0
then this ratio is 1. This would be valid if we had included lump sum taxes
in the model. If MDL > 0, as is the case in this model, this ratio is greater
than unity.
4 Revenue Valuation
In this section, an expression for MTR is provided which is consistent with
the no risk sharing assumption. We argue that under uncertainty, the MTR =
@CE(TR)
@￿ is the additional value (certainty equivalent) of the tax revenue raised
by increasing marginally the capital income tax. To be consistent with the
assumption that the government is just as e¢ cient in handling aggregate
risk as the private sector the standard security market line of the capital
asset pricing model developed by Lintner (1965), Mossin (1966) and Sharpe
(1964) is used to value the tax revenue.14 Assume that the government issues
securities that have a claim on (7a) and (7b) as reproduced below:
G2g = ￿r(Y1 ￿ C
￿
1) + ￿(x2g ￿ r)a
￿
1 (12a)
G2b = ￿r(Y1 ￿ C
￿
1) + ￿(’x2b ￿ r)a
￿
1 (12b)
where G2i (i = g;b) is precisely the tax paid by a typical individual. The
market value of the above stochastic revenue ￿ ow would be equal to:




13Sandmo (1998) de￿nes the MCF ￿as the multiplier to be applied to the direct resource
cost in order to arrive at the socially relevant shadow price of resources to be used in the
public sector.￿
14This is also consistent with the household￿ s portfolio allocation choice as represented
by equation 6.
9where z2m is the after tax excess return of the market portfolio, cov(G2;z2m)
is the covariance of the revenue ￿ ow with the excess return of the market port-
folio and var(z2m) is the variance. The second part of (13) is the risk premium
of the uncertain tax revenue ￿ ow as determined by the asset pricing model.
Substituting in (13) the lump sum transfer and after simple manipulations
yields:











CE(G2) = ￿r(Y1 ￿ C
￿
1) (15)
where E(z2) = p(x2g ￿r)+(1￿p)(’x2b ￿r) is the pre-tax excess return
of the household￿ s portfolio. The certainty equivalent of the tax revenue
from capital income taxation is equal to the tax revenue generated from risk
free interest on total savings, i.e., ￿r(Y ￿ C￿
1). The certainty equivalent of
the tax revenue generated from the excess return held by the household is
zero.15 The excess return of the security held by the investor is equal to
E(z2) = E(z2m)
cov(z2;z2m)
var(z2m) according to the security market line. Thus the
market value of the revenue stream from the excess return equals zero. The
market prices all investments. As a result the government￿ s ￿nancial assets,
which have a claim on the revenue of the excess returns, is of no value to
the market because the claim does not o⁄er to the investor any additional
diversi￿cation possibilities other than those already o⁄ered by the market.
































The loss is the smallest when there is full loss o⁄set provisions since
the second term in the numerator is absent in this case. MCF increases
as loss o⁄set provisions are removed. The next section provides a numerical
illustration of the magnitude of the deadweight loss of capital income taxation
under various parameter values.
15See also Hamilton (1987), Zodrow (1995), Ahsan and Tsigaris (1998).
105 Numerical Simulations
The parameters of the model are largely based on empirical regularities.
In addition some extreme cases are examined. The relative risk aversion
parameter is assumed to vary between 0 (risk neutrality) to a maximum of
value of 4.16 A zero RRA value will give results for a risk neutral agent whose
behaviour is governed by RINCE preferences developed by Farmer (1990). A
risk neutral investor is seen to allocate the entire savings to the (on average)
higher yielding risky asset. She is also allowed to borrow the safe asset. The
other extreme occurs when the relative risk aversion of an investor is at the
other end of the spectrum in which case she invests all savings in the safe
asset. Under this case the investor would still choose the consumption stream
based on the inter-temporal rate of substitution. The welfare results in this
latter case will correspond to the two period model life cycle model under
certainty (eg, Feldstein, 1978). The elasticity of substitution is allowed to
vary between 0.00 and 2.5.
The distribution of the asset returns is as follows. The value of the safe
return is assumed to be 50 percent over a life cycle of say 25 years, which
would translate to an annual compounded rate of return of 1.64 percent. This
annual rate closely corresponds to the real yield on long government bonds.
The rate of return of the risky asset is chosen initially to yield an average real
annual rate of 5.80 percent, which is slightly higher than the real return on
the S & P 500 index of approximately 5.17 percent over the past forty years.
The probability of the good state of nature is set at 80 percent. The good
state of nature yields an annual return of return equal to 6.6 percent, while
the bad state of nature yields an annual loss of approximately 2.7 percent.
The tax rate is set initially at 40 percent.
Numerical simulations follow. Figure 1 presents the marginal tax revenue
generated by increasing the capital income tax rate under the assumption of
full loss-o⁄set provision. Figure 2 illustrates the no loss-o⁄set provision.
16Although higher RRA values can be simulated they do not provide any more insights.
11MTR under loss o⁄set is above the no loss o⁄set function under the same
relative risk aversion and EIS parameters. Thus the government is not capa-
ble of generating more additional revenue by imposing loss o⁄set restrictions.
12This phenomenon arises because under no loss o⁄set provision savings are
more severely discouraged than in the case of loss o⁄set. Furthermore, MTR
increases with the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, more so for low
levels of risk aversion parameter. Holding the elasticity of substitution con-
stant (and less than unity), MTR increases the with relative risk aversion
parameter. In the case where the elasticity of substitution is greater than
unity MTR declines as relative risk aversion parameter increases.
MCF ranges from the value of 1 to a maximum of 1.25 approximately.17
Figure 3 indicates that the largest MCF occurs for a person with the highest
elasticity of substitution and the highest risk aversion parameter. For a
representative investor with an elasticity of substitution of 1.67 and a relative
risk aversion of around 2, the e¢ ciency cost would equal fourteen cents to a
dollar of revenue raised.
MCF varies with respect to EIS and RRA values.
With respect to EIS, MCF falls as the inter-temporal elasticity of substi-
tution decreases for risk aversion parameters greater than unity. However,
17In terms of MDL relative to savings, the losses range from zero to 6.6 percent of savings
in the same range of parameters. The largest deadweight losses, as a fraction of savings,
occur for a person with the highest elasticity of substitution and the highest risk aversion
parameter (i.e., 6.6 percent of savings). An investor with an elasticity of substitution of
1.67 and a relative risk aversion of around 2 would require compensation equal to 4.8
percent of his savings in order to be as well o⁄ as in the pre-tax position.
13for an individual that has a relative risk aversion less than unity, the losses
peak at an inter-temporal elasticity of substitution greater than unity and
then fall continuously as EIS falls.
With respect to risk aversion, MCF rises as RRA increases when the
elasticity of substitution is greater than unity. MCF falls as RRA increases
when the elasticity of substitution is less than or equal to unity. With a
very high value of 4 for the relative risk aversion, individuals hold most of
the entire fund in the safe asset, MCF is equal to 1.15 given an elasticity of
inter-temporal substitution of 1.67. For the same inter-temporal substitution
value, the MCF drops to 1.10 given risk neutrality. Thus under full loss o⁄set
provisions, the less risk averse an investor is, the lower the e¢ ciency cost of
capital income taxation for a given EIS.
Figure 4 below presents the results under the other extreme assumption
of having no loss o⁄set provisions. 18 Under no loss o⁄set the less risk averse
an investor is, the higher the e¢ ciency cost of capital income taxation.
The welfare losses range from a value of unity to a maximum of 2.48
within the given range. Under no loss o⁄set, the welfare loss is highest for
18The same MCF shape (although lower corresponding MCF values) is observed for
partial loss o⁄set provision levels up to an approximate value of ’ =0.80 level beyond
which the Figure 4 shape takes e⁄ect.
14a person that combines a high elasticity of inter-temporal substitution but
is not very averse to risk taking activity. For example, a person with an
elasticity of substitution of 1.67 and a relative risk aversion parameter of
0.5 will have a welfare loss equal to $2.48 for every dollar of revenue raised.
But a risk aversion parameter of 2 results in a welfare loss of capital income
taxation equal to $1.62. Contrasting this latter example with the case of
full loss o⁄set provision, the welfare loss under no loss o⁄set increases by a
magnitude of forty-eight additional cents to the dollar of revenue raised.19
Finally, Figure 5 shows the deadweight losses for a representative agent
with an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 1.67 and a relative risk
aversion parameter of 2 over various tax rates and loss o⁄set levels. As
expected, the deadweight losses increase with the tax rate and with less
provision to loss o⁄sets. The DWL are at a minimum when there is full loss
o⁄set provisions and the capital income tax rate is as low as possible.
19The welfare losses as a fraction of savings range from zero to a maximum of thirty
eight percent of savings over these same parameter values. For example, a person with
an elasticity of substitution of 1.67 and a relative risk aversion parameter of .5 will have
a welfare loss of 38 percent! While a risk aversion parameter of 2 will have a welfare loss
of capital income taxation equal to 18 percent of savings. Contrasting this later example,
with the case of full loss o⁄set provision, the welfare loss under no loss o⁄set increases by
a magnitude of four times.
156 Conclusion
This paper has investigated deadweight losses stemming from capital income
taxation in a two period model, comparing the impacts of complete and in-
complete loss o⁄set provisions. Key assumptions are that all risk remains
within the private sector and that non-expected utility preferences prevail.
The results indicate that capital income taxation under less than full loss o⁄-
set deters risky investment activity and adds substantially to the ine¢ ciency
of taxing capital income.
E¢ ciency cost estimates without loss o⁄set, under plausible assumptions
about attitudes towards risk and time preference and given an initial capital
income tax rate of forty percent, were shown to be on the order of sixty
two cents per dollar of tax revenue. In contrast, under the same attitudes
towards consumption and risk but with full loss o⁄set, the dead weight loss
was approximately fourteen cents per dollar of revenue raised.
In the absence of loss o⁄set, e¢ ciency costs are found to be greatest where
agents have a low relative risk aversion and a high elasticity of inter-temporal
substitution. With loss o⁄set provisions in place, the welfare loss is greatest
under high relative risk aversion. Finally, deadweight losses are found to
increase not only with the tax rate, holding o⁄set provisions constant, but
also inversely with loss o⁄set levels at any given tax rate.
Future research might fruitfully explore the consequences of asymmetric
information between the government and investors, of the government￿ s being
more (or less) e¢ cient in the handling risk than the private sector, and of
extending the analysis to a multi-period decision framework.
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188 Appendices
8.1 Appendix 1: Calculations leading to optimal choices:











C2b = (1 + r(1 ￿ ￿))(Y1 ￿ C1) + (x2b(1 ￿ ’￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)r)a1 + G2b (A1.2a)
C2g = (1 + r(1 ￿ ￿))(Y1 ￿ C1) + (1 ￿ ￿)(x2g ￿ r)a1 + G2g (A1.2b)
Maximization of A1:1 with respect to current consumption (C1), and the
amount invested in the risky asset (a1) yields the ￿rst order conditions 5 and










2 z) = 0 (A1.4)
Utilizing the two states of nature approach these optimal conditions can
be re-written as follow:
C
￿￿1




















2g (x2g ￿ r)(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ p)C
￿￿
2b (x2b(1 ￿ ￿’) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)r) = 0 (A1.6)







C2b = B0C2b (A1.7)
19Inserting A1:7 into using A1:5 and solving for C1 as a function of C2g
yields:
C1 = A0C2g (A1.8)
where A0 =
￿












The following system of equation composed of A1:7 and A1:8 along with
the pre-budget constraints can be used to solve for C1;C2g;C2b;a1 and m1:
C1 = A0C2g
C2g = B0C2b
C2b = (1 + r)(Y1 ￿ C1) + z2ba1
C2g = (1 + r)(Y1 ￿ C1) + z2ga1
C1 = Y1 ￿ (a1 + m1)
After simple manipulations and de￿ning B1 = B0(z2g ￿ z2b)(1 + r) and
A1 = A
￿1
0 (z2g ￿ B0z2b) current consumption is:
C
￿




while risky asset allocation can be represented as follow:
a
￿
1 = a1(￿;’)Y1 =
(1 + r)(B0 ￿ 1)
(A1 + B1)A0
Y1 (A1.10)





































































Under full loss o⁄set provision
@B0


















The e⁄ect gets stronger with increases in EIS (￿). The RRA operates
through its in￿ uence on average consumption and savings behavior. However
under no loss o⁄set current consumption may be discouraged in some cases
since there are two opposing e⁄ects.
The e⁄ect of a tax increase on risky investment activity is given by dif-










































































and even more so under imperfect loss o⁄set due to the presence of the
the second term in A2:5.
218.3 Appendix 3. Calculations leading to MDL=@L1
@￿ :
The standard measure of marginal deadweight loss is the additional transfer
the individual would have to receive in the ￿rst period to compensate her for
the e⁄ects of the tax increase. To ￿nd the deadweight loss of capital income
taxation, we di⁄erentiate the value function with respect to the tax rate and














where the optimal choices are given in section 8.1 of the appendix and
where L1 represents the ￿rst period consumption transfer a household would
require in order to be as well o⁄ as before the capital income tax. Therefore
de￿ne MDL =
@L1
@￿ v=c as the marginal deadweight loss. The ￿rst order
condition for consumption allocation given the stochastic lump sum transfer








while, that of asset allocation is:
E(C
￿￿
2 z) = 0 (A3.3)
Utilizing the budget constraint after re-distribution of the tax revenue
C2 = (1+r)(Y1 ￿C￿
1)+za￿
1 and di⁄erentiating the value function A3:1 with































After simple manipulation, and utilizing the ￿rst order conditions the
e¢ ciency loss quantity can be written in terms of compensating variation as
in the text.
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